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 A substantial portion of the rise in Social Security Disability Insurance rolls since 1984 
has been attributed to the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act. Using data from the 
National Health Interview Survey, I examine whom the Act effectively targeted. The analysis 
shows that new enrollees were demonstrably taller than previous enrollees, suggesting that the 
Act expanded eligibility to individuals in better health and socioeconomic circumstances. 
However, the estimated effect of increased SSDI eligibility on employment is low, suggesting 
that the Act targeted males who would have otherwise been unemployed. 
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I. Introduction 
The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides cash-transfers to 
individuals whose capacity for work is substantially limited.  In 2008, the program provided 
$106 billion in benefits to 9.3 million disabled workers and their dependents.  To target the 
work-disabled, the program requires potential beneficiaries to satisfy a set of medical criteria.1  
These criteria have changed since the program’s inception to reflect working knowledge of 
functional limitations and health. 
 A major change to the program’s medical eligibility criteria occurred in 1984 with the 
Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act.  The Act contained three particular amendments 
that likely expanded SSDI rolls.  The first amendment relaxed the medical eligibility criteria by 
allowing claimants with multiple, non-severe disabilities to qualify for benefits; prior to the Act, 
a claimant must have had at least one severe medical impairment.  The second amendment 
allowed pain associated with an identifiable medical condition to be considered in determining 
functional capacity.  As a result, individuals with identifiable impairments causing pain, 
particularly musculoskeletal conditions, became newly eligible for benefits.  The third 
amendment relaxed the eligibility criteria for mental illnesses by placing less weight on medical 
factors and more weight on functional factors.  This statute increased the likelihood of an SSDI 
award, particularly for mental disorders other than “mental retardation”. 
 By some accounts, the Act is responsible for much of the rise in SSDI rolls from 1984 to 
2003 (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Autor and Duggan, 2006; Duggan and Imberman, 2008).  
Between these two years, the number of disabled-worker beneficiaries more than doubled from 
2.60 million to 5.87 million, an increase of 126 percent.  According to Duggan and Imberman 
                                                            
1 The program also requires claimants to have a substantial work history.  This requirement is 
discussed in detail in Duggan, Singleton, Song (2007) and elsewhere. 
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(2008), the rise in benefit receipt attributable to the Act can explain approximately 53 percent of 
growth among males and 38 percent of growth among females. 
Despite the dramatic effect of the Act on disability receipt, few studies systematically 
examine whom the Act effectively targeted.2  This study attempts to address this topic by 
simulating the population most likely affected by the policy.  The main data source is the 
National Health Interview Survey, collected annually since 1957 to track health trends in the 
non-institutionalized, US population.  For the current study, I use data years spanning 1983 to 
1986 and 1992 to 1996 (hereafter, the former data period is referred to as 1983 and the latter as 
1992, respectively).  I restrict the empirical analysis to males since the Act had a larger impact 
on SSDI enrollment among them.  SSDI receipt is not explicitly reported in these data, so I 
determine SSDI receipt by whether an individual is enrolled in Medicare.   
 Using NHIS data, I first demonstrate the degree to which Medicare receipt approximates 
SSDI receipt - the latter measured from administrative data - over time.  I show that the rate of 
Medicare receipt among individuals with musculoskeletal conditions closely approximates levels 
and changes in the rate of SSDI receipt for this condition, but grossly underestimates SSDI 
receipt for mental illness.  Therefore, for the empirical analysis, I focus on the rise in SSDI 
receipt for musculoskeletal conditions only. 
 I then examine the extent to which the rise in SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal conditions 
overstates or understates the likely impact of the policy.  On one hand, SSDI receipt may 
overestimate the impact of the policy if new beneficiaries categorized as musculoskeletal after 
the Act would have, in the absence of the Act, been enrolled in SSDI and categorized as 
something else.  On the other hand, the rate of SSDI receipt may actually underestimate the 
                                                            
2 For a review of transfer programs targeted at the disabled, see Bound and Burkhauser (1999). 
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impact of the Act if individuals with multiple disabilities, including a musculoskeletal condition, 
became newly eligible as a result of the Act, but were not assigned as musculoskeletal.  I show 
that growth in SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal conditions likely overstates the impact of the Act 
on receipt for older males and understates the impact for younger males. 
 I next infer the characteristics of males targeted by the Act by examining changes in 
demographic characteristics among Medicare enrollees over time.  The most notable change 
among enrollees with a musculoskeletal condition is height: enrollees in 1992 were significantly 
taller than enrollees 1983.  The increase in height cannot be explained by national trends or a 
general expansion in SSDI rolls over time. Since height is associated with health and 
socioeconomic factors (Case and Paxson 2008), the results suggest that, in comparison to 
previous enrollees, the Act targeted males who were in better health, better economic 
circumstances, or both. 
 If the Act is known to have targeted males of a certain height, then, under certain 
assumptions, the effect of expanded SSDI generosity on labor supply can be measured.  In 
particular, the targeted height range of the Act can be used as instrument for SSDI receipt in 
1992.  Conditional on basic demographic information, instrumental variable estimates suggest 
that a one percentage point increase in SSDI enrollment increases labor force non-participation 
among males aged 30 to 49 by 2.5 percentage points (standard error: 0.37). The estimate is 
substantially larger than any estimate found by previous studies; at most, previous studies 
suggest a one-to-one relationship between SSDI receipt and nonparticipation. 3   Despite the large 
estimate on labor force participation, the effect of SSDI enrollment on employment is much 
                                                            
3 Large labor disincentive effects of disability benefits are reported by Parsons (1980) and Slade 
(1984).   
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smaller: a one percentage point increase in SSDI receipt decreases the rate of employment by 
0.68 percentage points (standard error: 0.37).   
The estimates become demonstrably smaller, however, when the effect of demographic 
characteristics are allowed to vary with time.  With this more flexible specification, the 
instrumental variable estimates for labor force non-participation and employment are 0.48 
(standard error: 0.79) and -0.11 (standard error: 1.1), respectively.  A full account of 
socioeconomic factors is not possible since the NHIS contains only basic demographic 
information, but the change in magnitude of the estimates to the inclusion of time-interacted, 
demographic controls suggests that the estimates serve as upper bounds of the true effect of 
SSDI on labor supply.     
The employment estimate presented here is considerably lower than the highest, upper-
bound estimate found in previous studies.  In a seminal study, Bound (1989) measures the 
counterfactual, upper-bound level of employment among SSDI beneficiaries by the employment 
level of rejected SSDI applicants; the explicit assumption is that employment of accepted 
applicants can be no greater than employment of rejected applicants.4  Using the Survey of 
Disability and Work, he finds that, among rejected male applicants aged 45 to 54, 36.7 percent 
were employed at time of the survey in 1972 and 48.9 percent were employed at the time of the 
survey in 1978; in other words, the effect of SSDI benefits on the rate of employment, at most, 
ranges from -0.37 to -0.49.  Thus, relative to previous studies, this study provides a lower, upper-
bound effect of SSDI on employment.     
 
                                                            
4 Variations of this strategy have been employed in subsequent work by Bound, Burkhauser, and 
Nichols (2003), Chen and van der Klauww (2008), Maestas and Yin (2008), and von Wachter, 
Song, and Manchester (2009).   
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II. Aggregate Changes in SSDI Receipt 
 The potential impact of the Act on disability rolls can be measured summarily by changes 
in SSDI receipt rates over time.  Aggregate rates of receipt among males in 1986 and 1993 are 
presented in the left panel of Table 1, and rates of receipt by diagnostic category are presented in 
the left panel of Table 2.  The numerator - the number of SSDI beneficiaries - comes from 
Ferron (1995) who, using administrative data from the SSA, reports the total number of SSDI 
beneficiaries in December of 1986 and 1993; the denominator - the estimated population of 
males - comes from US Census data. 
 As shown in Table 1, the rate of SSDI receipt increases with age: in 1986, the rate 
increased from 1.27 percent among males aged 30 to 39 to 11.73 percent among males aged 60 
to 64.  The change in receipt from 1986 to 1993, however, is greater among younger males - 
among males aged 60 to 64, the rate actually declines by 0.11 percentage points.   
 Table 2 shows rates by diagnostic categories.  The first three row sections - A, B, and C - 
correspond to musculoskeletal conditions, circulatory conditions, and mental illness, 
respectively.  As shown, the change in receipt rate is greatest for musculoskeletal conditions and 
mental illness – the former more so than the latter - suggesting that the Act had a measurable 
effect on SSDI rolls.  For musculoskeletal conditions, the level increase is greatest among the 
aged, but the relative increase is greatest among the young.  A similar pattern is evident for 
mental illness.  In contrast, the rate of receipt for circulatory conditions declined, particularly 
among the aged. 
 The relative increase in benefit receipt for musculoskeletal and mental illness suggests 
that the Act had a considerable impact on SSDI rolls.  The implicit assumption of this 
interpretation is that the rate of receipt for these conditions would have remained relatively 
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constant had the Act not been implemented.5  Even with the stable-rate assumption, however, the 
change in benefit receipt may not accurately represent the effect of the Act.  The ambiguity 
arises since the Act also granted benefits to individuals with multiple, non-severe disabilities.  
Thus, the first concern is that, following the Act, beneficiaries with multiple disabilities may 
have been categorized as musculoskeletal or mental illness, but, in the absence of the Act, would 
have been (or eventually would have been) awarded benefits and categorized as something else.  
If so, the aggregate change in SSDI receipt, particularly for musculoskeletal and mental illness, 
would overstate the true effect of the Act.   
The second concern is that individuals with multiple disabilities, including a 
musculoskeletal condition, may have been awarded benefits as a result of the Act, but the 
musculoskeletal condition was never the main cause for the inability to work.  If these 
individuals were awarded benefits but not categorized as musculoskeletal or mental illness, then 
the aggregate change in SSDI receipt for these conditions would understate the true effect of the 
Act. 
 
III. Addressing the Limitations of Aggregate SSDI Data 
A. Data 
 To address the limitations of aggregate SSDI rates, I use micro-level data from the 
National Health Interview Survey from 1983 to 1996.  A major redesign to the NHIS survey in 
years 1982 and 1997 preclude a direct comparison of data across these years.  Work-limited 
respondents designate one condition as the "main" cause of their disability, but can report as 
many additional conditions as applicable.  
                                                            
5 This assumption was used by Duggan and Imberman (2008), cited above, to measure the effect 
of the Act on SSDI receipt for mental illness and musculoskeletal conditions.   
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 Unfortunately, the data do not contain precise information on SSDI receipt; but the health 
supplement to the NHIS does contain whether an individual is covered by Medicare.  Since 
nearly all Medicare enrollees under the age of 65 are SSDI beneficiaries – beneficiaries become 
eligible for Medicare after two years of receiving SSDI benefits - Medicare coverage is a 
reasonable indicator of disability benefit receipt.6  I must therefore restrict the analysis to survey 
years that contain the health insurance supplement - an add-on to the core data - which pertains 
to years 1983 to 1986 and 1992 to 1996.  I define years 1983 to 1986 as the pre-reform period 
and 1992 to 1996 as the post-reform period.7  Consistent with most studies in the literature, I 
focus the empirical analysis on males. 
B. Aggregate Changes in Medicare Receipt  
 I first examine whether the rate of Medicare receipt estimated from the NHIS is a 
reasonable approximation to the rate of SDDI receipt measured from administrative data.  
Estimates of Medicare receipt are presented in the right panel of Table 1, and the rates of receipt 
by diagnostic categories are presented in the right panel of Table 2. 8 
 According to Table 1, the estimated rate of Medicare receipt slightly underestimates the 
rate of SSDI receipt among all age categories, but appears to underestimate the rate by more 
among the older age categories.  Among males aged 60 to 64, the rate of Medicare receipt in 
1983 is approximately 1.74 percentage points less than SSDI receipt.  The underestimates may 
                                                            
6 Individuals with end-stage renal disease are also eligible for Medicare benefits before the age 
of 65. 
7 The NHIS samples vary considerably across years.  To avoid arbitrarily overweighting smaller 
sample years using sample weights, I rescale the sample weights within survey year to sum to the 
sample size before any sample restrictions were made. 
8 A small number of observations do not report Medicare receipt status.  These observations are 
dropped from the analysis.  Additionally, a small number of observations report being work-
limited, but do not report their disabling conditions.  These observations are dropped from the 
sample to compute figures in Table 2. 
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reflect that Medicare coverage lags an SSDI award by two years; and since the growth in SSDI 
receipt increases with age, the underestimate would be greater at older ages.  Although different 
in levels, the change in Medicare receipt from 1983 to 1992 is similar to the change in SSDI 
receipt across all ages. 
 In Table 2, I examine rates of Medicare receipt across diagnostic categories.  Individuals 
are assigned to diagnostic categories by their reported, main disability.  As shown, the level in 
Medicare receipt is similar to the level of SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal and circulatory 
conditions, but slightly underestimates circulatory conditions at older ages.   
 Rates of receipt for mental illness and “other” conditions are presented in row-sections C 
and D, respectively.  As shown, Medicare receipt for mental illness systematically 
underestimates SSDI receipt, which may reflect that beneficiaries with mental illness are under 
the care of someone else or, since the NHIS represents the non-institutionalized population, are 
institutionalized.  The estimates may also reflect stigma of reporting a mental illness.  For 
“other” conditions, the rate of Medicare receipt is less than SSDI receipt, but the change 
Medicare receipt is comparable to the change in SSDI receipt. 
C. Empirical Strategy 
 To address the limitations of SSDI data in measuring the effect of the Act, I examine the 
change in disabilities reported by Medicare enrollees who report having "any" musculoskeletal 
condition.  The reason for considering any musculoskeletal condition - rather than a 
musculoskeletal condition as the main cause - stems from the limitations of aggregate measures 
of receipt described above.  First, if the prevalence of main musculoskeletal conditions - reported 
in Table 2 - increased by more than the prevalence of any musculoskeletal conditions, then the 
difference likely reflects categorical reassignment of beneficiaries who would have been 
9 
 
awarded benefits in the absence of the Act, though categorized as non-musculoskeletal.  And 
second, if the prevalence of main musculoskeletal conditions increased by less than the 
prevalence of any musculoskeletal conditions, the difference may reflect beneficiaries who 
became newly eligible for benefits after the Act, but were assigned to a non-musculoskeletal 
category.  
 The working assumption is that the number and composition of enrollees who report any 
musculoskeletal condition before and after the Act is a result of the Act itself.  This assumption 
seems plausible since the share of new enrollees for musculoskeletal conditions appears stable 
shortly before the Act (Duggan and Imberman 2008).9  The assumption also implies that the 
policy did not induce preexisting enrollees to report a musculoskeletal condition.  This additional 
assumption also seems plausible since - having already been awarded benefits - previous 
beneficiaries have no obvious incentive to report a musculoskeletal condition in response to the 
Act. 
D. Work-Limiting Disabilities 
 The rate of Medicare receipt among males who report any musculoskeletal condition, as 
well as the rate of those who report a musculoskeletal condition as the main cause, is reported in 
the top two row of Table 3.  The figures in the first and second panels correspond to before and 
after the Act, respectively; and within each panel, the sample is disaggregated into four age 
categories.  The rate of any musculoskeletal condition is greater than the rate of musculoskeletal 
conditions as the main cause since not all enrollees report the condition as their main disability.   
                                                            
9 This assumption is also supported by Hotchkiss (2004) who reports that the rate of 
musculoskeletal conditions reported in the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
remained fairly constant from 1986 to 1997.  One concern is that expanded benefit eligibility 
may encourage the detection of latent medical conditions and therefore the prevalence of 
disabilities (Kubik 1999, Singleton 2009), but this should not be a factor for musculoskeletal 
conditions causing pain. 
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 As indicated, among the two oldest age categories, the prevalence of any musculoskeletal 
condition increased by less than the prevalence of musculoskeletal conditions as the main cause.  
The increase in the latter prevalence among males aged 60 to 64 was 0.50 percentage points (3.5 
to 4.0), compared to the former of 0.64 percentage points (2.2 to 2.8).  Thus, approximately 20 
percent ((0.64-0.50)/.64) of the rise in SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal conditions may not 
actually represent new beneficiaries, but beneficiaries who would have been assigned to a 
different category in the absence of the policy.  
 In contrast to the older age categories, the prevalence of any musculoskeletal condition 
among younger males increased by more than the prevalence of musculoskeletal conditions as 
the main cause.  For males aged 30 to 39, the change in "main" and "any" was 0.11 and 0.14, 
respectively.  This suggests that the aggregate change in SSDI receipt among the young may 
only reflect 80 percent of total increase due to the policy (0.11/0.14).  
 To which categories new, younger beneficiaries with musculoskeletal conditions are 
being assigned - and from which categories new, older beneficiaries are being alternatively 
assigned - can be determined by the change in proportions of beneficiaries by the “main” 
disability category.  These proportions, reported as percents in Table 3, are computed for three 
categories: musculoskeletal, circulatory, and other.  (For example, 70.4 percent of males aged 30 
to 39 with any musculoskeletal condition in 1983 reported the condition as their main disability)  
The effect of reassignment on Medicare rolls can be measured by simulating the main-disability 
proportions among new beneficiaries only.  To perform the simulation, I assume that the 
proportions of main disabilities in 1992 would have remained at their levels in 1983 absent the 
Act.  If so, then the proportions among new enrollees can be derived from a simple weighted-
average calculation, where the weights are determined by the prevalence of any musculoskeletal 
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condition reported in the top row.  For example, the prevalence among males aged 30 to 39 
increased from 0.23 to 0.37 percent, implying that approximately one-third of beneficiaries in 
1992 are new.  If the previous two-thirds had not changed their reported main disability, then the 
proportion of new beneficiaries with any musculoskeletal condition who report the condition as 
the main cause must be 80.1 percent.  The other 20 percent, as shown in the table, were assigned 
as "other", implying that the Act may be responsible for as much as one-half (0.22*.014/0.07) of 
the rise in beneficiaries assigned to the “other” category reported in Table 2. 
 The same simulation for the two oldest age categories yields unrealistic proportions, 
exceeding one for musculoskeletal and negative for circulatory and other.  These proportions 
arise since the prevalence of those who report any musculoskeletal condition increased by less 
than the prevalence of those who report a musculoskeletal condition as the main cause.  To 
correct this implausibility, I assign all new beneficiaries (0.40 and 0.50 percent of males aged 50 
to 59 and 60 to 64, respectively) to the musculoskeletal category, and adjust the proportions for 
the circulatory and other categories to yield the observed proportions in 1992.  This calculation, 
provided in Appendix Table A, suggests that 3.8 percent of new musculoskeletal enrollees aged 
60 to 64 would have been assigned as circulatory in the absence of the policy.  Thus, among 
males aged 60 to 64, the Act may be responsible for as much as 24 percent (0.038*4.0/0.52) of 
the decline in Medicare receipt for circulatory conditions. 
 
IV. Effective Target Population 
A. Demographic Characteristics 
Similar to the analysis above, the demographics of the effective target of the Act can be 
inferred from changes in demographic characteristics among Medicare enrollees over time.  If 
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the characteristics of enrollees would have remained constant in the absence of the Act – an 
admittedly stronger assumption here than in the previous section – then the change in 
characteristics between 1983 and 1992 can be attributed to new enrollees as a result of the Act.  
In contrast to the previous section, where the population of interest was enrollees reporting any 
musculoskeletal condition, the current analysis focuses exclusively on enrollees who report a 
musculoskeletal condition as the main cause.  To improve the precision of the estimates from this 
restricted sample, I pool observations into two age categories: 30 to 49 and 50 to 64. 
Demographic changes are reported in Table 4.  The first through fourth columns report 
average characteristics for each age and year category pairs, and the final two columns report the 
change in demographics between 1983 and 1992.  As shown, the only statistically significant 
changes among enrollees are the likelihood of living in the Northeast (specifically among males 
aged 50 to 64) and height.  On average, Medicare enrollees aged 30 to 49 and 50 to 64 were 2.8 
centimeters and 1.7 centimeters taller, respectively, in 1992 compared to enrollees in 1983.    
The estimates suggest that the Act effectively targeted those who were taller, on average, 
than previous enrollees.  Previous studies show that adult height is strongly associated with 
height as a child, and child height in turn is determined by early-life nutrition and health (see 
Case and Paxson 2008).  Since early-life nutrition and health may positively impact both health 
and economic outcomes in adulthood, the increased height of Medicare enrollees suggests that, 
in comparison to previous enrollees, the Act targeted individuals in better health, better 
economic circumstances, or both. 
An alternative interpretation of the increase in height, however, is that the overall height 
of the population is increasing.  To examine this possibility, I examine the increase in average 
height among enrollees relative to the national average.  These estimates are reported in the top 
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panel of Table 5 using a difference-in-differences framework.  As shown, in 1983, young males 
enrolled in Medicare were 3.72 centimeters shorter than the national average.  But the increase in 
height among enrollees of 2.8 centimeters reduced this difference to a statistically insignificant 
1.04 centimeters.  The differential increase in height among young enrollees aged 30 to 49 
relative to the national average is therefore 2.68 (standard error: 1.2).  The same pattern is 
apparent for older males: the differential increase in height among enrollees aged 50 to 64 was 
1.18 centimeters (standard error: 0.73).  Thus, the increase in height among enrollees, 
particularly young enrollees, cannot be explained by national trends.      
Another alternative interpretation is that the relative change in height is mechanically 
related to the overall expansion of the SSDI program.  To examine this possibility, I estimate the 
average height of enrollees who report “other” as their main disability with no musculoskeletal 
conditions.  These estimates, also compared to the national average, are reported in the bottom of 
Table 5.  As shown, the differential rise in height among non-musculoskeletal enrollees was 
negligible and statistically insignificant.  The results therefore suggest that the differential rise in 
height among enrollees for musculoskeletal conditions cannot be explained by a general 
expansion of the SSDI program. 
B. Implications for Screening 
 The increase in height among enrollees with musculoskeletal conditions suggests that the 
Act targeted males who were taller than previous beneficiaries.  A natural question is whether 
newly enrolled beneficiaries are, on average, shorter than those who claim to be unable to work 
because of a musculoskeletal condition, but who are not enrolled in Medicare in 1992. 
14 
 
 To make this comparison, I simulate the height among new Medicare enrollees as a result 
of the Act.  To account for the national, upward trend in height, I base the simulation on the 
following linear regression: 
ܪ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௧ܲ ൅ ߙଶܯ ൅ ߙଷ ௧ܲ כ ܯ ൅ ߝ௜௧. 
ܪ௧ is height; ௧ܲ is a period indicator for years 1992 to 1996; and ܯ is an indicator of Medicare 
receipt (individual subscripts are suppressed).  The equation is estimated from the full sample of 
males so that ߙଵ reflects the national change in height, and the coefficient ߙଷ reflects the 
differential increase in height among enrollees.  The estimated height of Medicare enrollees in 
the absence of the Act is given by: 
ߙො଴ ൅ ߙොଵ ൅ ߙොଶ. 
And the simulated height of new Medicare enrollees as a result of the Act is given by: 
ሺߙො଴ ൅ ߙොଵ ൅ ߙොଶ ൅ ߙොଷሻ െ ܵ௣ሺߙො଴ ൅ ߙොଵ ൅ ߙොଶሻ
ܵ࢔
. 
The term ܵ௣ and ܵ௡ represent the share of previous and new enrollees among all Medicare 
enrollees in 1992.  These shares are implied by the prevalence estimates reported in the top row 
of Table 4 and are assumed nonrandom.10 
 The predicted heights among previous enrollees, and the simulated heights among new 
enrollees, are reported in Table 6.  As shown, new enrollees aged 30 to 49 are 4.3 centimeters 
(F-stat: 5.79) taller than previous enrollees.  And new enrollees aged 50 to 64 were 2.53 
centimeters taller, though the difference is not statistically significant (F-stat: 3.42).  
 I then compare the simulated heights among new enrollees to non-enrollees in 1992 who 
report being unable to work because of a musculoskeletal condition.  These estimated heights are 
                                                            
10 The nonrandom assumption seems reasonable since the estimated rates of Medicare receipt for 
musculoskeletal conditions closely approximate the rates of SSDI receipt (see Table 2). 
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reported in the far right panel of Table 6.  As shown, new enrollees are actually taller than non-
enrollees by about 1.5 centimeters, though neither difference for the two age categories is 
statistically significant.  One concern for this direct comparison, however, is that individuals may 
have been induced to report a musculoskeletal condition in response to the policy.11  If these 
induced responders are taller than new enrollees, on average, then the difference in height 
between new enrollees and non-induced responders would be underestimated.  On the other 
hand, if induced responders are shorter than new enrollees, on average, then the difference in 
height would be overestimated. 
 To potentially address the concern for induced responders, I compare the simulated 
height of new enrollees in 1992 to non-enrollees who report being unable to work because of a 
musculoskeletal condition in 1983.  If height among the latter group reflects the average height 
of new enrollees and non-induced, non-enrollees in 1992; and the simulated height of new 
enrollees in 1992 is greater than height among non-enrollees in 1983; then the new enrollees in 
1992 are likely taller than non-enrollees in 1992.  According to the data, the average height in 
1983 for male non-enrollees aged 30 to 49 and 50 to 64 was 178.4 (standard error: 0.43) and 
176.2 (standard error: 0.39) centimeters, respectively.  These heights are similar to the simulated 
heights of new enrollees in 1992, again suggesting no substantial height difference between those 
effectively targeted by the Act and those who, by 1992, were not. 
  
V. Analysis of Labor Supply and Self-Reported Work Limitations by Height 
A. Model 
                                                            
11 See Benetiz-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2004) for an empirical analysis of biases in self-
reported health status.  Bound (1991) analyzes self-reported versus objective measures of health. 
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 If the Act expanded SSDI rolls to included taller males, then, under certain assumptions, 
the effect of increased SSDI generosity on labor supply can be measured.  I model the structural 
effect of SSDI receipt on labor supply using the following equation: 
ܮ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܺ ൅ ܨሺ݄ሻ ൅ ߚଶܯሺܺ, ݄ሻ ൅ ݑ. 
In this model, ܮ is the labor market outcome; ܺ is a vector of individual characteristics; ܨሺ݄ሻ is a 
function of height ሺ݄ሻ which, conditional on ܺ, may proxy for health; ܯሺܺ, ݄ሻ is an indicator of 
Medicare enrollment as a proxy for SSDI benefit receipt; and ݑ is the structural error term.  
Since eligibility for SSDI benefits is determined by work opportunities and health status, 
Medicare enrollment is a function of both  ܺ and ݄.  
 The empirical difficulty of measuring the effect of SSDI receipt on labor market 
outcomes, represented by the coefficient ߚଶ, arises since ܯሺ. ሻ is determined by both ܺ and ݄, 
which themselves independently affect labor market outcomes.  Therefore, using cross-sectional 
methods, ߚଶ would be identified solely from nonlinearities of ܯሺܺ, ݄ሻ with respect to ܺ 
and ܨሺ݄ሻ; for example, if SSDI receipt were modeled as, 
ܯሺܺ, ݄ሻ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܺ ൅ ܩሺ݄ሻ ൅ ߤ, 
then ߚଶ is only identified by variation in ߤ and differences in ܨሺ݄ሻ and ܩሺ݄ሻ.  Since ߤ may be 
correlated with ݑ, and ܨሺ݄ሻ and ܩሺ݄ሻ are not known, cross-sectional estimates of ߚଶ would be 
difficult to defend. 
 As an alternative identification strategy, I exploit the fact that the Act targeted males by 
height.  In the context of the model, the Act affected SSDI receipt by manipulating the 
function ܩሺ݄ሻ.  Conceptually, ܩሺ݄ሻ may be a discrete function of height since, given a fixed 
budget, the government may target individuals in poorest health.  An expansion to the program 
would therefore increase the height threshold that determines the targeted and non-targeted 
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population.  Those most affected by the expansion would be taller than the former threshold but 
shorter than the new threshold; individuals just below the old threshold and above the new 
threshold would arguably not be affected by the reform.  Under this framework, the effect of 
expanded SSDI benefits on labor supply can be modeled as: 
ܮ௧ ൌ ߚ଴௧ ൅ ߚଵܺ ൅ ܨሺ݄ሻ ൅ ߚଶܯ௧ሺܺ, ݄ሻ ൅ ݑ௧, 
where, 
ܯ௧ሺܺ, ݄ሻ ൌ ߛ଴௧ ൅ ߛଵܺ ൅ ܩሺ݄ሻ ൅ ߜܴ௧ሺ݄ሻ ൅ ߤ௧. 
In the Medicare equation, ܴ௧ሺ݄ሻ is an indicator that equals one if the individual is observed in the 
post-Act period and his height falls within the height range targeted by the policy. 
 If ܴ௧ሺ݄ሻ is associated with increased Medicare receipt and satisfies the exclusion 
restriction (that ܴ௧ and ݑ௧ are uncorrelated), then ܴ௧ሺ݄ሻ serves an instrument for Medicare 
receipt and  ߚଶ is identified.  The exclusion restriction requires that, condition on ܺ and ܨሺ݄ሻ, the 
targeted height range is associated with labor supply only through the effect of increased benefit 
receipt.  I pursue this empirical strategy in the next subsections. 
A. Medicare Receipt 
 I begin by graphically examining the change in Medicare receipt by height.  Plots of the 
Medicare receipt rate across ten height categories are presented in Figure 1.12  Panel A 
corresponds to males aged 30 to 49, and Panel B corresponds to males aged 50 to 64.  As shown, 
among younger males, Medicare receipt decreased at the extreme ends of the height distribution 
and increased at the center.  Further inspection of the data reveals that the increase at the center 
                                                            
12 The discreteness of the height categories reflects the values that the NHIS reports this variable.  
The height definitions reported in this study reflects the floor value of reported height in 
centimeters; so, for example, individuals assigned to the 162 to 165 category contains individuals 
whose height is greater than or equal to 162 and less than 165.  The height categories span more 
than 99 percent of the sample, and the distribution of height does not change between 1983 and 
1992 (not shown).   
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is largely driven by enrollees with musculoskeletal conditions, whereas the change at the extreme 
ends of the height distribution is not (not shown).  
Among older males, Medicare receipt increased at the extreme ends of the height 
distribution, but there was no noticeable change near the center.  Further inspection of the data 
reveals that the percent of enrollees with musculoskeletal conditions increased near the center of 
the distribution, but, on net, overall rates of receipt did not change.  This is consistent with the 
results from section III: older males assigned as musculoskeletal after the Act would have been 
awarded benefits and assigned as something else in the absence of the Act. 
Since Medicare receipt did not increase substantially among males aged 50 to 64, the 
proceeding analysis focuses on younger males only.  And since the change in Medicare receipt at 
the extreme ends of the height distribution are unrelated to the Act, I focus on the seven height 
categories between 162 and 195 centimeters.  Demographic characteristics and Medicare receipt 
rates for these height categories are presented in Table 7.  As shown, height is correlated with 
education, race, and veteran status, but is not strongly correlated with geographic region.   
The change in Medicare coverage between 1983 and 1992 is shown in the bottom row of 
Table.  As indicated, there is no statistically significant change in Medicare coverage among the 
two lowest height categories and the highest height category; changes in between range from 
0.58 (standard error: 0.16) to 0.72 (standard error: 0.25).  Thus, to estimate the model of labor 
supply described above, ܴ௧ሺ݄ሻ equals one for males observed in 1992 between 172 and 190 
centimeters tall.      
B. Graphical Analysis of Labor Supply and Work-Limitations 
 Before estimating the labor supply equation, I first examine the changes in labor supply 
and self-reported work limitations by height.  These changes are shown graphically in Figure 2.  
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Panels A and B contain rates of non-labor force participation and employment, respectively.  As 
shown in panel A, the rate of non-labor force participation increased across all height levels, 
though the increase appears somewhat smaller for the highest height category.  However, there is 
no noticeable change in employment levels for any height category, except for a slight decline in 
the shortest height category.  Taken together, the figures suggest that the effect expanded SSDI 
benefits on labor force participation, if any, occurs among males who were previously 
unemployed.   
 In panels C and D, I plot the percent of males who report being unable to work and being 
unable to work specifically because of a musculoskeletal condition.  As shown in panel C, the 
percent of males who report being unable to work increased across all height categories, but 
increased by more among shorter males.  This pattern appears robust in panel D when the 
measure is defined by being unable to work because of a musculoskeletal condition.  Thus, the 
range of heights targeted by the Act, which lies in the middle of the height distribution, does not 
appear to be associated with an increase in self-reported work limitations.  If the relative change 
self-reported disabilities is a result of the Act (induced-responders), then the difference between 
simulated height of new enrollees in 1992 and height of non enrollees who are unable to work – 
presented in Table 6 – likely underestimates the difference in heights between new enrollees and 
non-induced, non-enrollees who are unable to work; in other words, new enrollees are taller than 
previous enrollees, but perhaps shorter than non-induced responders who were unable to work in 
1992.       
C. Implied Labor Supply Elasticity 
 The change in labor force non-participation relative to the change in SSDI receipt across 
height categories would provide a baseline measure of the effect of SSDI receipt on labor supply.  
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But since height is correlated with numerous factors that may independently affect labor supply – 
both cross-sectionally and over time – this baseline measure would provide an inaccurate 
estimate of the effect of SSDI benefits on labor supply. 
 I therefore begin by estimating the first-stage and reduced-form equations implied by the 
system of equations described above.  More specifically, I estimate the following equation: 
ܻ ൌ ߩ଴௧ ൅ ߩଵܺ ൅ ܦሺܪሻ ൅ ߠܴ௧ሺ݄ሻ ൅ ߳. 
ܻ is one of three outcome variables: indicators for Medicare receipt, labor force non-
participation, and employment.  The function ܦሺܪሻ - representing ܨሺ݄ሻ and ܩሺ݄ሻ - is modeled 
with dummy variables for six of the seven height categories.  The vector ܺ includes indicator 
variables for observed characteristics: education (high school or less), race (white), veteran status 
(veteran), and geographic region (Midwest, South, and West).  And again, ܴ௧ሺ݄ሻ equals one for 
individuals observed in the post period whose height falls within the targeted range (172 to 190 
centimeters) and equals zero otherwise.    
  The estimated coefficients are presented in columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 8 for Medicare, 
labor force non-participation, and employment, respectively.  Estimates of ߠ are reported in the 
top row.  As shown, the targeted height range is associated with a 0.64 percentage point increase 
in Medicare receipt between 1983 and 1992.  Medicare receipt generally decreases with height, 
as expected, and is positively associated with low education, being non-white, and living in the 
South.  Shown in column (3), the targeted range is also associated with a considerable increase in 
labor force non-participation, increasing by 1.6 percentage points by 1992; and, similar to 
Medicare receipt, labor force non-participation is positively associated with low education, being 
non-white, and living in the South.  In column (5), the targeted range is associated with a 0.43 
percentage point decline in employment, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
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 Together, the coefficients on the target range indicator suggest large labor disincentive 
effects of SSDI benefits.  The instrumental variable estimates for labor force non-participation 
and employment are reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 9, respectively.  As shown, a one 
percentage point increase in SSDI receipt leads to a 2.5 percentage point increase in labor force 
non-participation and a 0.68 percentage point decrease in employment.  The estimate for labor 
force non-participation is substantially higher than previous estimates (Parsons 1980 and Slade 
1984) and is likely overstated.  An obvious concern is that declining real wages among low 
skilled workers may have increased labor force non-participation and decreased employment 
independent of the Act (Juhn 1992; Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 1991).  If so, and if these changes 
differentially affected males in the targeted height range, then the estimated impact of the Act on 
labor force non-participation and employment reported in columns 3 and 5 of Table 8 would be 
overstated.   
 To control for relative changes in labor supply independent of the Act, I re-estimate the 
equations allowing the effects of the characteristics in vector ܺ to vary with time.  This more 
flexible specification would control for relative changes in labor supply that are unrelated to the 
Act to the extent that these characteristics and independent changes in labor supply are related.  
The first-stage and reduced-form estimates using this more flexible specification are reported in 
columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 8.  As shown, the increase in Medicare receipt among males in the 
targeted height range is robust to allowing the effects of  ܺ to vary over time: the coefficient 
declines from 0.64 to 0.57 and remains statistically significant.  However, the same coefficient 
for labor force non-participation declines from 1.6 to 0.27, and the coefficient for employment 
increases from -0.43 to -.06.  Thus, it appears that the relative change in labor supply among 
males in the targeted height range can be largely explained by time-varying effects of basic 
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demographic characteristics.  As a result, the instrumental variable estimates of the effect of 
SSDI benefits on labor supply diminish.  The estimates, reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 9, 
imply that a one percentage point increase in SSDI receipt leads to a 0.48 percentage point 
increase in labor force non-participation and a 0.11 percentage point decline in employment.   
 The magnitude change of the estimates suggests that the rise in labor force non-
participation and decline in employment associated with expansions to SSDI likely reflect 
changes to the labor market rather than the causal impact of SSDI benefits.  The effect of labor 
market shocks on SSDI receipt has been previously documented elsewhere (Autor and Duggan, 
2003; Duggan and Imberman, 2008; Black, Daniel, and Sanders 2002; and Rupp and Stapleton).   
Whether the estimates reflect the causal impact of SSDI benefits on labor supply remains 
unclear, however, since there are many other factors - in addition to those contained in the NHIS 
- that ideally would be controlled.  Nonetheless, the decline in the labor force non-participation 
effect from 2.5 to 0.48 by the inclusion of basic demographic information likely indicates that 
0.48 is an upper bound of the true effect.  Similarly, the effect of a one percentage point increase 
in SSDI benefits on employment among young males is at most -0.11 percentage points in 
absolute value. 
 Relative to previous studies, the estimated effect of SSDI benefits on employment is most 
comparable to that of Bound (1989).  In his study, he measures the upper-bound effect of SSDI 
benefit receipt on employment by the employment rate of rejected SSDI applications.  Using the 
Survey of Disability and Work, he finds that, among males rejected for SSDI benefits at ages 45 
to 54 years old, the percent employed following rejection ranged from 36.7 to 48.9, depending 
on the survey year.  These upper-bound estimates may be even larger when estimated among 
males 30 to 49 – the sample considered in this study – since younger males exhibit greater labor 
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supply than older males following SSDI rejection (Bound 1989; von Wachter, Song, and 
Manchester 2009). 
The difference in estimates may reflect that the empirical strategy considered in this 
study differs fundamentally from Bound’s.  In Bound’s study, the effect is measured from all 
rejected applicants, whereas, here, the estimate measures the effect of SSDI benefits on 
employment among those affected by the policy (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; Heckman, 
1997; Kling 2001).  Thus, the estimates taken together suggest that the marginal SSDI 
beneficiary has lower employment prospects than the average rejected SSDI applicant. 
 
VI. Concluding Discussion 
 A significant proportion of the rise in SSDI rolls since 1984 has been attributed to the 
Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, yet few studies systematically examine whom 
the Act effectively targeted.  I show that the rise in SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal conditions 
after the Act likely overstates the impact of the Act among older males and underestimates it 
among younger males.  Additionally, the target population appears to have been in better health 
and socioeconomic circumstances, as evidenced by height, compared to previous enrollees.  
Finally, the Act targeted young males who would have had low labor supply in the absence of 
the policy. 
 This study makes an important contribution to the broader understanding of the labor 
supply effects of SSDI benefits.  Several studies have documented a simultaneous increase in 
labor force participation non-participation and SSDI receipt (Leonard1979, and Parsons 1980), 
suggesting that SSDI benefits have substantial effects on labor supply behavior.  However, 
equivocating SSDI receipt with a behavioral response is misleading since those who are induced 
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out of the labor by SSDI benefits may not otherwise work (Bound and Burkhauser 1999).  
Indeed, Bound and Waidman (1992) find that males induced from the labor market do suffer 
from work limitations.  If the upper bound effects of SSDI benefits on labor force non-
participation and employment from this study are taken as the true effects, then more than two-
thirds of young males induced out of the labor market as a result of the Act of 1984 would have 
otherwise been unemployed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A 
Prevalence of "Main" Disability among Males with "Any" Musculoskeletal - Medicare Enrollees 
All  
New "Main" 
Musculoskeletal  All   Change in Share
1983-1986 1992-1996 1992-1996 1992-1996 
    50-59 60-64  50-59 60-64  50-59 60-64   50-59 60-64 
Percent of Population 1.5 3.5 1.9 4.0 1.9 4.0 - - 
Main Disability 
Musculosketal 58.1 62.0 66.9 66.7 69.8 70.5 2.9 3.8 
Circulatory 15.0 18.6 11.8 16.3 12.4 12.5 0.52 -3.8 
Other 26.9 19.4 21.3 17.0 17.8 17.0 -3.5 -0.04 
Observations 155 163  - -  358 319   - - 
Note: Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey.  See Table 3 for details.  
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Figure 1: Medicare Receipt Rate among Males by Height and Age 
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Figure 2: Labor Supply and Self-Report Limitation Status  
among Males Aged 30 to 49 
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Figure 2 (continued): Labor Supply and Self-Report Limitation Status  
among Males Aged 30 to 49 
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Table 1 
Rate of SSDI and Medicare Receipt among Males 
SSDI Receipt Medicare Receipt 
  1986 1993 Change  1983-1986 1992-1996 Change 
Age 
30-39 1.27 1.72 0.45 1.02 1.41 0.39 
40-49 2.30 3.15 0.84 1.74 2.31 0.57 
50-59 5.73 6.48 0.75 4.16 4.49 0.34 
60-64 11.73 11.62 -0.11  9.99 9.91 -0.08 
Note: SSDI receipt rates are author's tabulations using figures from Ferron (1995) and US 
Census data.  The numerator for SSDI receipt rate corresponds to December of the figure year; 
the denominator is based on the US civilian population in January in the year following the 
figure year.  The prevalence of Medicare receipt is calculated using the National Health 
Interview Survey.  Sampling weights - rescaled to sum within sample year to equal the sample 
size - were used.   
 
Table 2 
Rate of SSDI and Medicare Receipt among Males by Type of "Main" Work Disability  
SSDI Receipt Medicare Receipt 
  1986 1993 Change  1983-1986 1992-1996 Change 
A. Musculoskeletal 
Age 
30-39 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.16 0.27 0.11 
40-49 0.34 0.49 0.15 0.32 0.62 0.30 
50-59 0.95 1.53 0.58 0.87 1.32 0.45 
60-64 2.21 2.85 0.63 2.17 2.81 0.64 
B. Circulatory 
Age 
30-39 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 
40-49 0.27 0.24 -0.02 0.30 0.22 -0.08 
50-59 1.49 1.33 -0.17 1.27 0.99 -0.28 
60-64 3.73 3.33 -0.39 2.99 2.46 -0.52 
C. Mental Illness 
Age 
30-39 0.45 0.66 0.20 0.25 0.40 0.15 
40-49 0.56 1.02 0.47 0.28 0.46 0.18 
50-59 0.81 1.11 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.00 
60-64 1.11 1.30 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.01 
D. Other  
Age 
30-39 0.68 0.83 0.15 0.40 0.47 0.07 
40-49 1.14 1.39 0.25 0.59 0.69 0.10 
50-59 2.47 2.52 0.04 1.34 1.49 0.16 
60-64 4.69 4.13 -0.55  2.84 2.52 -0.32 
Note: SSDI receipt rates are author's tabulations using figures from Ferron (1995) and US 
Census data.  The numerator for SSDI receipt rate corresponds to December of the figure year; 
the denominator is based on the US civilian population in January in the year following the 
figure year.  The prevalence of Medicare receipt is calculated using the National Health 
Interview Survey.  Work-limited individuals who do not report their "main" condition were 
dropped from the sample.  Sampling weights - rescaled to sum within sample year to equal the 
sample size - were used.   
 
Table 3 
Prevalence of Disabilities among Males with "Any" Musculoskeletal - Medicare Enrollees 
Simulated New Medicare 
Enrollees 
1983-1986 1992-1996 1992-1996 
    30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64  30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64  30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 
Percent of Population 
Any 0.23 0.49 1.5 3.5 0.37 0.82 1.9 4.0 0.14 0.33 0.40 0.50 
Main  0.09 0.34 0.95 2.2 0.19 0.49 1.5 2.8 
Main Disability 
Musculoskeletal 70.4 65.4 58.1 62.0 74.1 75.7 69.8 70.5 80.1 90.8 114.1 130.8 
Circulatory 2.8 6.9 15.0 18.6 0.7 4.3 12.4 12.5 -2.5 0.6 2.5 -30.4 
Other 26.8 27.8 26.9 19.4 25.1 19.9 17.8 17.0 22.4 8.6 -16.6 -0.4 
Any Disability 
Circulatory 8.5 23.0 36.3 36.1 7.3 16.7 32.2 38.2 5.4 7.6 16.7 53.1 
Other 60.4 71.0 76.9 70.7 64.5 64.1 74.6 71.3 70.9 54.2 66.1 75.6 
Observations 38 53 155 163  114 244 358 319  - - - - 
Note: Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey.  Work-limited individuals who do not report their "main" 
condition were dropped from the sample.  Sampling weights - rescaled to sum within sample year to equal the sample size - were 
used.   
 
Table 4 
Characteristics of Medicare Enrollees with "Main" Musculoskeletal       
1983-1986 1992-1996 Change 
   30-49 50-64   30-49 50-64   30-49 50-64 
Percent of Population 0.13 0.77 0.36 1.45 - - 
Demographics 
White 78.6 80.8 77.9 80.6 -0.70 -0.23 
(5.3) (2.9) (2.5) (1.8) (6.1) (2.9) 
High School or Less 82.0 87.2 76.9 88.6 -5.1 1.4 
(5.0) (2.5) (2.6) (1.5) (5.6) (2.5) 
Northeast 11.2 19.5 19.0 13.5 7.8 -6.0 
(4.1) (2.9) (2.4) (1.6) (5.0) (2.9)* 
Midwest 15.7 18.2 23.9 21.2 8.2 2.9 
(4.7) (2.8) (2.6) (1.9) (5.5) (2.8) 
South  53.3 44.4 44.5 46.2 -8.8 1.8 
(6.5) (3.7) (3.0) (2.3) (7.5) (3.7) 
West 19.9 17.9 12.6 19.1 -7.2 1.2 
(5.2) (2.8) (2.0) (1.8) (5.9) (2.8) 
Height (centimeters) 174.3 175.2 177.1 176.9 2.8 1.7 
(0.96) (0.62) (0.63) (0.38) (1.1)* (0.62)* 
Observations 60 186   270 474   - - 
Note: Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey.  See Table 3 for details.  
Height figure excludes some observations that do not report this value.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  * Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level, reported only for the 
change estimates.  
 
Table 5 
Change in Average Height among Medicare Enrollees by "Main" Disability Relative to All 
              
"Main" Musculoskeletal 
Age 30 to 49 Age 50 to 64 
  1983-1986 1992-1996 Difference   1983-1986 1992-1996 Difference
Medicare 174.3 177.1 2.76 175.2 176.9 1.70 
(0.96) (0.63) (1.2)* (0.62) (0.38) (0.73)* 
All 178.1 178.1 0.09 176.8 177.4 0.52 
(0.036) (0.029) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.063)* 
Difference 3.72 1.04 1.69 0.52 
(0.96)* (0.63) (0.63) (0.38) 
Diff-in-Diffs 2.68 1.18 
(1.2)* (0.73) 
"Main" Other Excluding "Any" Musculoskeletal 
Age 30 to 49 Age 50 to 64 
  1983-1986 1992-1996 Difference   1983-1986 1992-1996 Difference
Medicare 174.4 174.9 0.55 175.7 176.1 0.42 
(0.82) (0.45) (0.93) (0.53) (0.37) (0.65) 
All 178.1 178.1 0.09 176.8 177.4 0.52 
(0.036) (0.029) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.063)* 
Difference 3.68 3.22 1.17 1.28 
(0.82)* (0.45)* (0.53)* (0.37)* 
Diff-in-Diffs 0.46 -0.10 
  (0.94)   (0.65) 
Note: Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey.  See Table 3 for details.  
Height figure excludes some observations that do not report this value.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  * Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level, reported only for the 
difference estimates.  
 
Table 6 
Height among Males with "Main" Musculoskeletal            
Medicare Enrollees 
Predicted Previous 
Medicare Enrollees
Simulated New 
Medicare Enrollees  
Non-Medicare 
Enrollees Unable to 
Work 
1983-1986 1992-1996 1992-1996 1992-1996 1992-1996 
    30-49 50-64  30-49 50-64  30-49 50-64  30-49 50-64  30-49 50-64 
Percent of Population 0.13 0.77 0.36 1.45 0.13 0.77 0.22 0.68 1.28 2.20 
Height 174.3 175.2 177.1 176.9 174.4 175.7 178.7 178.2 177.3 176.7 
(0.96) (0.62) (0.38) (0.63) (0.48) (0.34) (0.97) (1.53) (0.27) (0.29) 
Observations 60 186  270 474  - -  - -  996 739 
Note: Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey.  See Table 3 for details.  Height figure excludes some 
observations that do not report this value.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
Table 7 
Characteristics by Height Category: Males Aged 30 to 49 
Height 162-165 167-170 172-175 177-180 182-185 187-190 193-195
High School or Less 64.7 58.7 52.1 45.1 44.5 42.9 37.3 
(0.73) (0.45) (0.37) (0.33) (0.35) (0.55) (1.0) 
White 65.1 75.2 82.3 87.9 88.4 86.6 87.0 
(0.73) (0.40) (0.28) (0.22) (0.23) (0.38) (0.72) 
Veteran  18.5 25.3 29.0 29.9 28.9 28.3 27.3 
(0.60) (0.40) (0.34) (0.31) (0.32) (0.50) (0.96) 
Northeast 23.1 22.3 21.2 21.5 19.2 17.5 16.9 
(0.65) (0.38) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.42) (0.80) 
Midwest 17.4 21.8 24.9 25.4 26.5 27.1 26.5 
(0.58) (0.38) (0.32) (0.29) (0.31) (0.49) (0.95) 
South 32.0 32.9 32.6 31.8 33.8 34.1 33.1 
(0.72) (0.43) (0.35) (0.31) (0.34) (0.53) (1.0) 
West 27.4 23.0 21.3 21.2 20.6 21.3 23.5 
(0.69) (0.39) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) (0.45) (0.91) 
Medicare 
1983-1986 2.1 2.0 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.2 
(0.42) (0.24) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.19) (0.44) 
1992-1996 2.6 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 
(0.29) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.27) 
Change 0.46 -0.03 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.72 -0.03 
(0.51) (0.28) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.25) (0.52) 
Range No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4241 11772 18334 22208 19653 8096 2177 
Note: Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey.  See Table 3 for details.  
The sample is restricted to those with Medicare and height information.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.   
 
Table 8 
Linear Probability Estimates             
Medicare NLFP Employment 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Range*Post 0.64 0.57 1.6 0.27 -0.43 -0.06 
(0.09)** (0.26)* (0.19)** (0.49) (0.25) (0.61) 
Height: 167-170 -0.31 -0.3 -0.86 -0.83 0.76 0.76 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.55) (0.55) (0.66) (0.66) 
Height: 172-175 -0.97 -0.92 -2.9 -2.0 2.2 2.0 
(0.28)** (0.31)** (0.54)** (0.61)** (0.65)** (0.75)** 
Height: 177-180 -1.2 -1.1 -3.4 -2.5 2.9 2.7 
(0.27)** (0.31)** (0.53)** (0.6)** (0.63)** (0.74)** 
Height: 182-185 -1.2 -1.2 -3.5 -2.5 2.8 2.5 
(0.27)** (0.31)** (0.53)** (0.6)** (0.64)** (0.75)** 
Height: 187-190 -1.2 -1.1 -3.9 -2.9 3.5 3.3 
(0.29)** (0.33)** (0.56)** (0.63)** (0.69)** (0.79)** 
Height: 193-195 -0.78 -0.78 -1.7 -1.7 2.5 2.5 
(0.36)* (0.36)* (0.71)* (0.71)* (0.85)** (0.85)** 
High School or Less 1.5 1.1 4.8 3.6 -7.4 -6.9 
(0.09)** (0.13)** (0.17)** (0.27)** (0.21)** (0.37)** 
White -0.38 -0.23 -5.3 -4.6 7.3 7.8 
(0.14)** (0.23) (0.3)** (0.53)** (0.36)** (0.69)** 
Veteran  -0.13 -0.44 0.43 -0.3 -0.59 0.57 
(0.1) (0.13)** (0.19)* (0.27) (0.24)* (0.37) 
Midwest 0.09 0.05 -0.56 0.48 0.77 -1.49 
(0.12) (0.19) (0.23)* (0.37) (0.3)* (0.52)** 
South 0.64 0.37 0.53 1.01 0.27 -0.84 
(0.12)** (0.19)* (0.24)* (0.36)** (0.29) (0.5) 
West -0.09 0.12 1.1 1.9 -1.6 -2.2 
(0.12) (0.2) (0.26)** (0.42)** (0.33)** (0.56)** 
Post Interactions No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 86481 86481 86481 86481 86481 86481 
R-Square 0.01 0.01  0.02 0.02  0.03 0.03 
Note: Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey.  See Table 3 for details.  
The sample is restricted to those with Medicare and height information.  Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.  * and ** indicate significance at the five and one percent level , respectively.  
 
Table 9 
Instrumental Variable Estimates       
NLFP Employment 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Medicare 2.5 0.48 -0.68 -0.11 
(0.37)** (0.79) (0.37) (1.1) 
Observations 86481 86481   86481 86481 
Note: Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey.  See Table 3 for details.  
The sample is restricted to those with Medicare and height information.  Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.  * and ** indicate significance at the five and one percent level , respectively.  
 
